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NOTES

NOTES
DEDICATION IN PENNSYLVANIA
Dedication as a method of conveying land is of common law origin1 but the
dispute as to its beginnings is widespread. Tiffany holds that at its inception it appeared to be confined to dedication of land for highway uses, but he acknowledges
that the scope of the doctrine has been very greatly extended.2 Some Pennsylvania
examples of this extension relate to parks,8 wharves and landings, 4 cemeteries, 5
and schools. 0 Digby holds that dedication stems from a mere right to go upon the
land for the purpose of doing something essential to the common good, such as
pasturage. 7 The meaning of dedication as stated by Blackstone is the recognition of
"customary rights arising out of the necessities of the thing or of the public." s
Dedication differs from more formal methods of conveyancing in that it can be
effective only to transfer title to the pnblic. It may be express or it may be implied
from acts of the grantor, or even implied from acts of the grantee-the public itself.
Some jurisdictions distinguish between dedication to the public and what they consider a "private dedication" but the majority holds that there is only a dedication
to the public and rejects the differentiation between these two types. 0
Modem dedication is divisible into two elements. The first is an act manifesting an intent to yield property rights to the public. The second, where required,
is acceptance. This is some act by the public or by municipal or other public authorities indicative of the acceptance. The dedication can only be made by the owner
of the fee or one authorized by him to convey land; hence, a tenant for a term of
years cannot bind his reversioner by a dedication to public use. 10
Methods of Dedication
There are no particular formalities required to constitute an express dedication upon the part of the land owner; any act which clearly indicates an intent to
dedicate is sufficient. 1 ' Whatever form or method of proof is used to establish this
intent, the evidence must be "clear and convincing." 12 In equity courts it is a ques10 (2nd ed. 1941)
2 4 TIFFANY ON REAL PROPERTY, 329 (3rd ed. 1939).
3 Commonwealth v. Rush et al. 14 Pa. 186; (1850).
4 City of Pittsburgh v. Epping-Carpenter Company, 194 Pa. 318; 45 'A.129 (1900).
S Pott v. School Directors of Pottsville, 42 Pa. 132 (1862).
6 Pott v. School Directors of Pottsville, supra.
7 Digby, HISTORY OF THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY, 182 (5th ed.)
8 2 BLACKSTONE COMMENTARIES * 33, (Lewis's ed. p.500; 1898).
9 Rose v.Fisher, - W. Va. -, 42 SE 2d. 249, 172 ALR 160 (1947).
10 Schenly v. The Commonwealth for the use of the City of Allegheny, 36 Pa. 29, 58 (1839).
11 Waters v. Philadelphia, 208 Pa. 189; 57 A. 523 (1904).
12 Kniss v.Borough of.Duquesnei 255 Pa. 417; 100A. 132 (1917).
1 Kirkwood, CASES ON THE LAW OF CONVEYANCES;
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tion for the chancellor, Is and in law courts a question for the jury." Some examples
of this express dedication are: the opening of a street, followed by an invitation to
the public to use the same and a later request to the borough to take the street over; I I
a proclamation;16 a recital of a dedication in the deed under which the donor purchased the property;' 7 and where the land owner deeds land to someone in privity
of contract with him, expressly declaring an adjacent street dedicated to the public
forever.'8
The second method of dedication is implied from actions by the grantor. Probably the form most often met with is sub-division of one's land into lots, and a sale of
these lots with reference to a plan or plat of the lots showing the included streets.
The result is that a relationship of the purchaser to the land under the streets is
created. What that relationship is, has been variously called a contract with the public,' 9 and not only the purchasers of lots abutting thereon but all other purchasers
in the general plan may assert the character of public street; 20 an implied covenant
that the streets would remain open;" a contract with the purchaser giving him the
rights to use and also the public the right to use.2 2 Other cases have merely called
it dedication of the street to public use.23
It is not vital that the streets be opened on the land, mere plotting of the map
is sufficient. 2 ' It is also enough that some lots on the plat are sold, not necessarily
some on that particular street.' 5 With reference to the grantor in these cases, the

courts speak of estoppel'6 or state that "his acts are such that his testimony to
the effect that he had no intention of dedicating cannot be received to contradict
the plain legal effect of the recorded instrument and the subsequent sales with
reference to it."27

Recordation of the plan by the grantor is not necessary in order that the public rights may arise.28 It is stated in City of Pittsburgh v. The Epping-Carpenter
Company' 9 that the "mere making of a plan, even if recorded, does not constitute
a dedication until the rights of third persons have accrued by sale of lots or public
use." The sale of the lots according to the plan is the important thing in this situ18 Borough of Mountville v. Gable, 73 Pa. Super. 189, (1919).
14 Wensell v. North Versailles Township, 136 Pa. Super. 485; 7 A. 2d. 590 (1939).
1 DuBois Cemetery Co. v. Griffin, 165 Pa. 81; 30 A. 840 (1875).
16 Commonwealth v. Alburger, 1 Wharton 469; (Pa. 1836).
17 Commonwealth v. First National Bank of Danville, 41 D. and C. 139 (Pa. 1941).
18 Van Auken v. Freed, 45 D. and C. 597; (Pa. 1942).
19 Commonwealth v. Rush, 14 Pa. 186 (1850).
20 In Re Opening of Pearl Street, I11 Pa, 565; 5 A. 430 (1886).
21 In Re Opening of Brooklyn Street, 118 Pa. 640; 12 A. 664 (1888).
22 Heckerman v. Hummel, 19 Pa. 64 (1852).
28 McCall v. Davis, 56 Pa. 431, (1865).
24 Ferguson's Appeal, 117 Pa. 426; 11 A. 885 (1888).

28 Trutt v. Spotts, 87 Pa. 339. (1878).
26 Shetler v. Welzel, 242 Pa. 355; 89 A. 455 (1913).
27 Snyder v. Commonwealth, 353 Pa. 504; 46 A. 2d 247 (1946).

28 Transue v. Sell, 105 Pa. 604 (1884).
29 City of Pittsburgh v. The Epping-Carpenter Company, 194 Pa. 318; 45 A. 129 (1900).
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ation. 8 0 The deed may refer to the plan, 81 or the lots may have been purchased by
82
lot number on the plan, or the lots sold by reference to the plan.
The third method by which a dedication may arise is public user. The principle
is that twenty-one years of adverse user under claim of right is sufficient to give a
rebuttable presumption of a grant 88 but this must be clearly distinguished from
the use by the public jointly with the owner and by his mere sufferance, which
latter condition no matter how long continued establishes no right by dedication. 4
This third method appears to be very similar to prescription." Tiffany in holding
that it is not says:"
"The public strictly speaking cannot acquire rights by prescription.
Since a grant cannot be made to the public there is no room for the presumption of a grant in such case. (The presumpiton of a lost grant being
an apparent touchstone in prescription.) The analogy of prescription has
however been freely applied in the case of highways on the theory that
an adverse user of private land by the public for the prescribed period
gives rise to a presumption that the land was dedicated for a highway and
the term 'prescription is almost invariably used in that connection."
Incidents of Dedication
The effect of dedication standing alone is to establish in the public a power
to create from this dedicated land the desired public necessity or improvement. The
general rule is expressed as "upon dedication and acceptance both the grantor and
the public are bound by it and the public could not change the purpose as long as
anyone objected." 81 Dedication generally appears to be static, in other words the
land can only be accepted and used for what it was offered, but in the case of Commonwealth v. Conneltsville Boroughs s land originally dedicated as a boat yard for
travellers was changed into a public park and on part of this a town hall was erected.
Land specially dedicated cannot be diverted to public use otherwise than to
the use to which it was expressly dedicated.98 It has been held however, in the line
of cases of which Connellsville Borough40 is an example, that a dedication of land
to public purposes was not such a special dedication and it is not an alteration
of the original use to authorize public squares as locations for public buildings.41
Insofar as streets are concerned, it has been held that a dedication of streets carried
with it also a dedication of a storm sewer system,42 and that an adjoining lot owner
80 Trutt v. Spotts, 87 Pa. 339 (1878).
81 O'Donnell v. Pittsburgh 234 Pa. 401; 83 A. 314 (1912).
82 Pittsburgh v. Epping Carpenter Company, 194 Pa. 318; 45 A. 129 (1900).
88 Coun.y of Susquehanna v. Deans, 33 Pa. 131 (1859).
84 Griffin's Appeal, 109 Pa. 150 (1885).
85 Milford Borough v. Burnett, 288 Pa. 434; 136 A. 669 (1927).
86 4 TIFFANY ON REAL PROPERTY 551 (3rd ed. 1939).
87 Commonwealth v. Rush, t4 Pa. 186 (1850).
8 Commonwealth v. Connellsville Borough, 201 Pa. 154; 50 A. 825 (1902).
89 Wentz v. Philadelphia, 301 Pa. 261; 151 A. 883 (1930).
40 Commonwealth v. Connellsviile Borough, sapra.
41 Mahon v. Luzerne County, 197 Pa. 1; 46 A. 894 (1900).
42 Cheltenham and Abingtona Sewerage Company v. Public Service Commission, 311 Pa. 175;
166 A. 649 (1933).
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would not be enjoined from laying a drain pipe in a street dedicated and accepted
by the public. 48 However, this apparent easing of the restrictions has not gone so

far as to include a sale of lots, originally part of a square dedicated to public use,
although the municipality intended that the proceeds be used in payment for a waterworks.

4

The act of dedication in itself can bring to the public or municipality no liability for injury from failure, or duty to maintain and repair this dedicated land until,
and unless, the public accepts the offer. The public as a whole must accept the
offer, because a dedication will be presumed to be intended for the public as a
whole and not for part of the public in exclusion of any other part. 45 As indicated
above there can be no liability on the part of the municipality for injuries sustained
on property dedicated to public use but not accepted by the public or by their representatives, the municipality.
Acceptance by the public
Acceptance may be express, may be implied from certain acts of municipal
dominion over the dedicated land, or it may be implied from acts of the public in
its own right.
The first of these, express acceptance, is ordinarily indicated by some formal
act of the municipal officers charged with such matters. It may be by ordinance,' 6
or other councilmanic decree' 7 or as stated in Wensell v. North Versailles Township:48
"by municipal authorities within their powers acting as representatives
of the public, and formal powers acting as representatives of thepublic,
and formal acceptance by them of dedicated property opened and available for a specified use is 'accepted' by and on behalf of public, thereby
making dedication complete without further public action.
The act of acceptance must be an affirmative act, mere silence not being sufficient to constitute acceptance.' 9
From certain acts of municipal dominion, illustrative of intent to exercise
dominion over the dedicated land, acceptance may be inferred. This is the second
type of acceptance, and relative to it, Wensell v. North Versailles Township6o dedares:
"In the absence of a formal acceptance the liability of a municipality
to keep a dedicated street in a safe condition for public travel may be asserted and established upon two separate and distinct grounds. One is
48 Ormsby Land Company v. Pittsburgh, 276 Pa. 68; 119 A. 730 (1923).
44 Commonwealth v. Rush, 14 Pa. 186 (1850).
45 Penny Pot Landing or Commonwealth ex rel Northern Liberties v, City of Philadelphia, 16
Pa. 79 (1851).
4s Steel v. Huntingdon Borough, 191 Pa. 627; 43 A. 398 (1899).
41 Steel v. Huntingdon Borough, .apra.
48 Wensell v. North Versailles Township, 136 Pa. Sup. 485; 7 A. 2d 690 (1939).
49 Steel v. Huntingdon Borough, supra.
50 Wensell v. North Versailles Township, Fupra.
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long continued public user without any formal act of acceptance and the
other is authorized or ratified municipal acts from which an acceptance
may be implied."
Some examples of this type of acceptance are: sewer construction in the bed
of the dedicated street, 51 authorization of the construction of a street railway upon
it,52 and the repair and maintenance of the highway. 53 In relation to this latter
phase of the question, Steel v. Huntingdon Borough54 states:
t ... acceptance may be shown either by ordinance or by repairs to
the streets directed to be made by council when assembled. If the repairs
to the street at the point in quesion were by the street commissioner or a
street committee, or even by the chief burgess, then there is no evidence
of the acceptance unless the council subsequently ratified them. Such subsequent ratification may be shown by the payment of the expense of repairs
but the mere payment of money to the one making the repairs is not evidence of ratification unless the council at the time was aware that it was
paying for repairs to these streets and knowingly did pay for then4."
However, this making of repairs by the street commissioners and the expenditure of money by other public officials pursuant to the dedication and without
council authorization has been held to be some evidence on the question of whether
or not the public looked upon and accepted the land as public property.61
These decisions apparently limit the right of acceptance to acts of the elected
deliberative body, and are supported by other decisions permitting other legislative
bodies to do the same thing in their provinces. 5 6
The third type of acceptance is the one which may arise from actions by the
public. The public user effective to demonstrate acceptance of a dedication is the
same as that necessary to show a dedication; i.e. the user must be defined, uniform,
adverse, and under a claim of right. 5 ' The use here must be according to the intention of the offeror, or if there is no such dedication, by a defined use. Mere use
by a "loose rambling way of passing over a lot and by different routes at different
times creates no right."58 The time element, while important in the showing of a
dedication, may cause a defined or express dedication to become effective in less
time than twenty-one years.5 While it has never been said how much less, it has
been indicated that circumstances will govern. One example is in the case of Grant
v. Dickson City Borough,40 where a period of fourteen months was not long enough
to show acceptance, particularly since the street had been opened primarily for land
tompany operations and the plan had only been recorded for six months.
In the case of Steel v. Huntinjdon Borough 1 there is the statement that the
"use of these (roads) not accepted by the borough, by the owners of lots abutting
51 Kniss v. Borough of Duquesne, 255 Pa. 417; 100 A. 132 (1917).
52 McKee v. Pennsylvania Railroad Company, 255 Pa. 560; 100 A. 454 (1917).

58 Steel v. Huntingdon Borough, 191 Pa. 627; 43 A. 398 (1899).
54 Steel v. Huntingdon Borough, supra.

55 Kniss v. Boough of Duquesne, 255 Pa. 417; 100 A. 132 (1917).
5' Case of the Philadelphia and Trenton Railroad Company, 6 Wharton 25 (Pa. 1840)
57 CommoAwealth v. Philadelphia Railway Company, 135 Pa. 256, 19 A. 1051 (1890).
5 Arnold v. Cornman, 50 Pa. 361 (1865).
59 Washington Borough v. Steiner, 25 Sup. 392 (1904).
60 Grant v. Dickinson City Borough, 235 Pa. 536; 84 A. 454 (.1912).
61 Steel v. Huntingdon Borough, 191 Pa. 627; 43 A. 398 (1899).
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on them or by others delivering coal, flour, and hay for the occupants of the lots,
or for any other purpose does not render the borough liable for their proper and
reasonable repair." This case at first glance eliminates the possibility of acceptance
by public user, by a later case, Kniss v. Borough of Duquesne82 holds that this
Huntingdon Borough case must be read in the light of Ackerman v. City of Williamsports 8 and Grantv. Dickinson City Borough," both of which hold that adverse user
for the statutory period is sufficient to establish either a dedication or an acceptance.
Type of Acceptance Required
Dedication is a continuing offer of a piece of land to a municipality for public
use.85 Insome cases, as indicated above, acceptance is a vital part of dedication and
in others it is unnecessary to fix a right in the public. It need not be immediate but
may be made when public necessity or convenience arises. 68 Where it is necessary,
as in the case of express dedication, and completed, the effect of acceptance is to
impose burdens and liabilities on public authorities as regards conditions and repair
of the property; to render the offer of dedication irrevocable where in limited cases
it is revocable; and to give the municipality rights of control as regards the property,
as well as safeguarding the public interests in the free use of the property. In express
dedication any one of the three types of acceptance is enough.
In the second type, implied dedication from actions of the grantor, the question of acceptance for this type was discussed in City of Pittsburgh v. The EppingCarpenterCompany67 as follows:
"The dedication of land for public use by means of plans has been long
recognized. It is true that acceptance by the public is necessary to fix the
right. By sale of lots and those acts of acceptance the dedication is irrevocable. Such dedication becomes irrevocable when the interest of third persons is acquired by sale of lots or acceptance for the public by public use
or municipal action .......
The mere making of a plan, even if recorded, does not constitute a dedication until the rights of third persons have accrued by sale of lots or
public use; the property remains under the control of the owner and the
plan may be modified or abrogated by him at will."
From this it appears that sale of the lots, or acceptance in any of the three
methods is necessary. Without one of these four things there can be no right in
the public.
In the third type of dedication-implied from public user, the question of acceptance apparently does not arise. If it did, the fact that it is created in exactly the
same manner as one possible type of acceptance would make the requirement superfluous.
62 Kniss v. Borough of Duquesne, 255 Pa. 417; 100 A. 132 (1917).
68

Ackerman v. City of Williamsport, 227 Pa. 591; 76 A. 421 (1910).

64 Grant v. Dickson City Borough, 235 Pa. 536; 84 A. 454 (1912).

85 Milford Borough v. Bennett, 288 Pa. 434; 136 A. 669 (1927).
88 City of Pittsburgh v. Epping-Carpenter Company, 194 Pa. 627; 43 A. 398 (1899).
61 City of Pittsburgh v. Epping-Carpenter Company, supra.

NOTES

PartialAcceptance
The question of acceptance of only a portion of a dedicated plot of land for
any one of a number of purposes leads to some very difficult questions. Apparently
the rule in Pennsylvania is that an acceptance of a portion indicating a purpose by
the public to accept the gift fixes the public right to the whole of the subject matter.08 However the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has stated that "where only a pazt
of the property dedicated by ordinance to certain public purposes was used therefore,
there was no acceptance by the public of the dedication of the part not so used. -69
In this case these other portions were never opened for public use as a park and
were used for dumping grounds or were leased to tenants. The court held the acceptance must depend on the intention to ultimately use the whble for public purposes. This depends on the nature of the use made of a part and the condition and
location of the other parts."70 This case can apparently be distinguished on its facts
because the parts which the municipality sold as not dedicated for park purposes
were not contiguous to the land accepted and used by the public as a park. In the
recent case of Easton v. Koch,71 the Pennsylvania Superior Court has underlined
the continuing adherence to the rule of the majority of cases when it flatly stated
"any public use of a part of the property indicating a purpose to accept the gift fixes
the public right to the whole." The court here was quoting City of Pittsburgh v.
The Epping-CarpenterCompany,72 an earlier Supreme Court case.
Applicable Statutes
Inasmuch as the majority of the questions of dedication stem from acquisition
of streets and highways, it may be of interest to notice some of the Pennsylvania
Statutes which affect this question.
The general authority of the various municipalities to lay out, open, and maintain streets is contained in the act of 1915,78 which has been subject to modification
by amendment. In the case of cities of the third class, the act of 1931 establishes
in them these rights while repealing the authority relative to these smaller cities in
the earlier act.1 4 A parallel situation exists as to boroughs whose authority is now
contained in the 1947 Borough Code.76
This Borough Code also provides that no one shall open or dedicate any street
or any drainage facilities for public use in any borough without first submitting
suitable plans to the council for approval or necessary modification. The plans must
then be filed with the Borough Engineer and the street shall not be opened except
68 City of Pittsburgh v. Epping-Carpenter Company, supra.

69 Trustees of the Philadelphia Museum v. Trustees of the University of Pennsylvania, 251 Pa.
125; 96 A. 126 (1915).
70 Trustees of the Philadelphia Museum v. Trustees of the University of Pennsylvania, sxpra.
71 Easton v. Koch, 152 Pa. Sup. 327; 31 A. 2d. 747 (1943).

72 City of Pittsburgh v. Epping Carpenter Company, 194 Pa. 627; 43 A. 398 (1899).
78 Act of May 28, 1913, P.L 573, sec. 1; 53 P.S. 552.
14 Act of June 23, 1931, P.L. 932, Art. XXIX, sec. 2915, 53 P.S. 12198-2913.
75 Act of July 10, 1947, P.L 1621, 53 P.S. 13531.

42
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in strict compliance with these plans.76 Appeal from any decision of the council
is by petition to the Court of Quarter Sessions of the County, which court may approve, modify or reverse council's order relative to the plan so filed.77
The result of this statute has been held to be that the approval of the City Planning Commission of a plan of lots upon which streets are laid out and intended to
be dedicated to public use in an acceptance of the proposed dedication and thereafter all such streets and alleys on the plan were subject to municipal control. 78
Earl H. Parsons
76 Act of 1947 supra. sec. 1666; 53 P.S. 13697.
77 Act of 1947 supra. sec. 1667; 53 P.S. 13698.
78 Schwab v. Yerkes, 21 Lehigh Law Journal 147 (1948).

